Vagueness At the Highest Level: How the Supreme Court
Confirmation Hearings Brought An Infrequently Discussed Legal
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By: Brett S. Garson

Abstract:
Recusal has been present in one form or another in most
civilized societies dating back to the sixteenth century. Today,
recusal law finds its place in American jurisprudence at §§ 144
& 455. The scarce case law and lack of scholarly attention given
to recusal perpetuates its aura of ambiguity and makes
application of recusal standards to real factual situations
difficult. When D.C. Circuit judge John Roberts interviewed with
high White House officials seven days prior to hearing Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld—a case where President Bush was a defendant and also
the personal designator of Salim Hamdan as an enemy combatant—
the contemporaneous events seemed to place the future Chief
Justice in the scope of the § 455(a) recusal standard. An in
depth look into other controversial § 455(a) situations, which
involved high profile justices, will evince the need for recusal
reform. After careful consideration of several scholars’ recusal
reform proposals, this Comment recommends the formation of an
independent oversight committee composed entirely of retired
federal judges.
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I. Introduction
In the last six months, the Supreme Court has seen two new
members join the bench. During both confirmation hearings, each
candidate answered hundreds of questions, which many times were
tough-minded—-causing the Justice to sidestep an answer or give
an unsatisfactory response to an inquisitive Senator.1
Additionally, the newly appointed Justices were both grilled on
questions of recusal;2 an area of law that maintains an aura of
ambiguity and vagueness.3 While the media did not hone in on the
recusal issues presented during the confirmation hearings, this
Comment will illuminate the importance of recusal by analyzing a
controversial situation that involved Chief Justice Roberts.4
Public confidence in judicial fairness and impartiality
legitimizes the American government.5 In the Federalist Papers,
Alexander Hamilton states the importance that life tenure and a
permanent salary have in allowing the judicial branch to act
impartial, an especially important attribute as “the weakest of
the three departments of power.”6 The Constitution requires that
Federal judges are appointed as a result of their fairmindedness, impartiality, and unbiased nature;7 however, no
appointed judge decides the merits of a case with a tabula rasa.8
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, bias or prejudice towards a
party is the prerequisite for a judge9 to recuse10 himself from
hearing a case.11
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The history of recusal in American jurisprudence finds its
primary focus in the twentieth century, yet it dates back to as
early as the eighteenth century.12 This Comment begins with an
introduction to the history of recusal through legislative
change, scandal, benchmark decisions, and American Bar
Association recommendations. Next, a background discussion of
the main case Hamdan v. Rumsfeld will detail a situation where
recusal became an issue. Following the introduction of recusal
and Hamdan, this Comment will compare Justice Roberts’ situation
in Hamdan to other highly publicized recusal episodes.
Subsequent to the recusal case analysis, this Comment will
investigate leading scholars’ suggestions to improve recusal
law, which will be followed by an oversight committee proposal.
Finally, this Comment will conclude with a summary of the
arguments laid out in the analysis and predict the implications
of changing the recusal process.

II. Background
The standard that a judge should act impartial in deciding
the outcome of an adversarial meeting dates back to ancient
times.13 In American jurisprudence, however, the significant
changes to recusal law and its application to federal judges
gained prominence in the early twentieth century.14 The first
recusal statute was passed by Congress in 1792.15 In 1821,
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Congress broadened the 1792 statute by amending it to require
district court judges to recuse themselves when either litigant
was related or connected to the judge.16 Congress added a second
recusal statute in 1911—-because of public criticism of the
judiciary17--which allowed a party to file an affidavit to
disqualify a district court judge who displayed general bias or
prejudice.18 The Congress codified both the first and second
recusal statutes in 1948. The former recusal statute is present
day 28 U.S.C. § 455, while the latter is present day 28 U.S.C. §
144.19 Additionally, the 1948 amendments changed the recusal
statutes from “for cause”20 provisions to self-enforcing
provisions that required judges to decide whether they should be
disqualified for impartiality.21
The 1970’s brought significant controversy to the judicial
branch that prompted reform by the American Bar Association
(hereinafter “ABA”) and Congress. In 1968, the confirmation
hearings of Justice Fortas revealed that he consulted the White
House on important matters including the Detroit riots of 1967.22
A Supreme Court Justice consulting the White House on important
domestic issues violated separation of powers and resulted in
public distrust of the federal courts.23 The Judicial branch
suffered a second black eye when Judge Clement Haynsworth Jr.
failed to be confirmed to the Supreme Court on account of his
lapses in ethical judgment.24
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Swift action was needed to “resuscitate” the ethical
standards of the federal judiciary and the ABA stepped up to the
challenge. In 1969, a group of renowned legal leaders headed by
Roger J. Traynor commenced meeting to reform the judicial
standards.25 The ABA’s House of Delegates26 unanimously voted in
favor of the Traynor committee changes to the Code of Judicial
Conduct.27 Most notably, the committee stressed the importance of
an appearance standard, a tougher guideline that helped judges
determine when recusal was appropriate.28 Furthermore, in April
1973, the U.S. Judicial Conference29 adopted a similar, but more
stringent form of the ABA’s Code.30 These legal governing bodies
set the stage for Congress to enact new standards of their own.
Congress knew the time was right to amend the judicial
disqualification statutes—-as a result of the change in judicial
standards by the ABA and U.S. Judicial Conference, the
Haynsworth pecuniary improprieties, the Fortas separation of
powers controversy, and the Rehnquist conflict of interest
situation31—-and enacted legislation that ameliorated many of the
deficiencies of § 455.32 The Senate and House Judiciary
Committees submitted detailed reports prior to amending § 455.33
Both Reports explained the underlying reasons behind the changes
made to the recusal statute; however, this Comment will solely
refer to the House Report because it includes more commentary
and was published a year later.34

7

Congress wanted to synthesize the ABA’s Code of Judicial
Ethics with § 455 because a dual standard, ethical and
statutory, existed that confused judges when deciding whether
recusal was appropriate.35 Congress also placed great importance
on the Judicial Conference applying the new disqualification
Canon36 to all federal judges.37 Most importantly, Congress
replaced the subjective standard—-“in his opinion” with an
objective standard “his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned”—-to renew public confidence in the judicial
process.38 Since the 1970’s, neither § 455 nor § 144 have
undergone significant statutory language change. In spite of the
stagnant congressional action, modern court cases have led to
important growth in the interpretation of recusal.
Historically, Congress and the ABA shaped recusal law,
however, a few cases played a significant role in the early
development of recusal principles because their rulings
publicized the enforcement gaps in the recusal process.39 Aside
from Laird v. Tatum,40 few cases made noteworthy changes to
recusal law until the 1980’s. In 1988, Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp.41 affirmed the importance of the
statutory recusal law changes of the 1970’s when the Supreme
Court applied the objective standard42 to recusal in order to
preserve public confidence in the judicial process.43
Additionally, Liljeberg clarified the retroactive status of §

8

455, which is critical to the effectiveness of the recusal
statute.44 Liteky v. United States45 provided the next momentous
change in recusal law because the decision explained the oft
misinterpreted extrajudicial source rule.46 In Cheney v. United
States District Court for the District of Columbia,47 the media
highlighted the problems inherent in the recusal standards; the
issue of whether Justice Scalia would recuse himself from
hearing the case became such a public spectacle48 that he
released a memorandum explaining in detail why recusal was
inappropriate.49
The history of recusal viewed through legislative change,
ABA recommendations, scandal, and benchmark decisions, verifies
the complicated nature of determining whether disqualification
is necessary; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld provides the ideal setting for
scrutinizing recusal standards. As Justice Jackson poetically
put it, “The opinions of judges, no less than executives and
publicists, often suffer the infirmity of confusing the issue of
a power's validity with the cause it is invoked to promote, of
confounding the permanent executive office with its temporary
occupant.”50 Hamdan places the court in a position to shape the
scope of presidential powers, which layman and the media, seem
to question more and more;51 the appearance of an Executive
juggernaut who selects Justices that he believes will not oppose
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his legislation reinforces why the Roberts’ situation should be
closely examined.
Judge John Roberts was one of three judges who presided
over the controversial Hamdan.52 A two-tier analysis of Hamdan
reveals the significance of the case to both recusal law and the
war on terror. The first tier deals with the allegations that
Justice Roberts should have recused himself from hearing Hamdan
because he was contemporaneously interviewing with top White
House officials.53 The second tier examines the high stakes
involved in the administration’s war on terror, which could sink
or swim depending on Hamdan’s outcome.54

A. An Appearance of Impropriety?
Judge Roberts met with Attorney General Alberto Gonzales on
April 1, six days before Hamdan’s oral arguments.55 Additionally,
Roberts met with other high White House officials on May 3.56 The
job-clinching interview between President Bush and Judge Roberts
took place on July 15, the same day Roberts joined the Hamdan
decision.57 No public knowledge of the meetings existed until
Judge Roberts filled out a questionnaire for the Senate
Judiciary Committee prior to the confirmation process;58 the
attorney who represented Salim Hamdan also lacked awareness of
the meetings.59
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B. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Salim Ahmed Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan during
hostilities in that country that resulted from the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.60 After Hamdan’s capture, the
United States military transferred him to the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility.61 On July 3, 2003, President Bush designated
Hamdan for trial by military commission because it was believed
Hamdan was a member of al Qaeda or involved in terrorism against
the United States.62
In the first Hamdan trial, the District Court concluded
that a competent tribunal never determined whether Hamdan was
entitled to prisoner of war (“POW”) status under the Geneva
Conventions.63 Furthermore, until a competent tribunal determined
Hamdan’s status, he could only be tried by court-martial under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).64 Next, the court
found that the Military Commissions’ rules of procedure were
inconsistent with a court-martial convened under the UCMJ,
making them unlawful.65 Last, the court inferred that the
creation of the military commissions by the President broadened
the executive powers inherent in the Constitution.66
On appeal, the government prevailed over Hamdan. The
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia concluded that no
separation of powers issue existed because Congress authorized
the President to create the Military Commission that was to try
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Hamdan.67 The circuit court determined that the 1949 Geneva
Convention did not apply to Hamdan,68 and even if it did, Hamdan
could not enforce the Convention provisions in court.69
Therefore, the President’s determination70 that Hamdan was a
member of al-Qaeda nullified the jurisdictional issue, which
allowed the Military Commission71 to try Hamdan rather than the
court-martial under the UCMJ.72
The myriad issues present in the Hamdan proceedings evince
the complex nature of the legal arguments raised by both sides.73
The background information discussed the major issues found in
both the original trial and appeal; however, the forthcoming
analysis will primarily concentrate on the separation of powers
issue because this issue gives the Roberts’ situation
distinction.74

III. Analysis
A. Recusal in a Nutshell
A look at the big picture clarifies the situation. First,
an objective observer—-the threshold of interpreting the §455(a)
appearance standard75—-could conclude that Judge Roberts’ chances
of nomination would decrease if he took an unfavorable position
on the administrations use of Military Commissions. Second,
Salim Hamdan brought a separation of powers claim76 against the
President for establishing the Military Commissions and

12

President Bush was a defendant in the case77—-both very serious
issues. Third, Judge Roberts never informed the public or
Hamdan’s counsel of the interviews.78 Fourth, unlike the Supreme
Court, the appeals court may rotate in a different judge if one
of the initial judges recuse.79 Fifth, the same day the Circuit
Court released the Hamdan decision in favor of the Bush
Administration, Roberts and President Bush had an interview.80 An
application of the previously mentioned facts to section 455(a)-“Any justice, judge, or magistrate [magistrate judge] of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned”81-suggests “questions of impartiality”, requiring Judge Roberts’
recusal.
Justice Stevens delivered the preeminent § 455(a) decision
in Liljeberg, stating that “advancement of the purpose of the
provision – to promote public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial process – does not depend upon whether or not the judge
actually knew of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, so
long as the public might reasonably believe that he or she
knew.”82 Stevens’ opinion reiterated the congressional intent of
§ 455—-err on the side of caution when the appearance of bias is
present.83
Did Judge Roberts err on the side of caution? High White
House officials84 interviewing Judge Roberts as a possible
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Supreme Court nominee was completely ethical; in fact, the ABA’s
Model Code of Judicial Conduct approves of interviewing
potential appointment nominees.85 However, the ethical dilemma
exists because of the timing of the interviews in relation to
the Hamdan trial proceeding and the heavy involvement by
President Bush—-designating Hamdan as an enemy combatant and
being the primary defendant in the trial.
The April 1 interview with Attorney General Gonzalez
clearly indicated the administration considered Judge Roberts as
one of the top candidates to fill a Supreme Court vacancy.86 Six
days later, Roberts heard the oral arguments in the Hamdan
appeal87--a trial where the administration’s war on terror
policies were seriously questioned.88 No one will ever know
whether Roberts joined the opinion because he realized a
possible Supreme Court nomination loomed in the near future, but
the enormity—-the administrations use of Military Commissions to
try alleged terrorists89--of the Hamdan decision certainly raises
ethical questions.90

B. High Profile Cases Where a Recusal Controversy was Present:
The Roberts’ recusal controversy is most easily understood
when placed in the context of other highly debated court cases.
In the next two sections, this Comment will discuss two Supreme
Court cases where a Justice’s appearance of impropriety was
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questioned. Additionally, in both cases the Supreme Court
decided significant Constitutional decisions,91 which depending
on the outcome, would create noteworthy change throughout our
country. Each case analysis will begin with background
information, followed by an introduction of the recual
controversy, and end with a comparison of the case’s situation
to Roberts’ situation.

i. The Duck Hunt
Following the 1974 statutory change to recusal law, the
Supreme Court avoided controversies stemming from these changes
for a lengthy period of time. The highest court’s luck ran out92
when Justice Scalia went on a duck-hunting trip with Vice
President Dick Cheney while Cheney v. United States District
Court for the District of Columbia was pending before the
Supreme Court.93 Cheney involved an energy group--created by
President Bush and chaired by Vice President Cheney--whose
primary goal was to institute a national energy policy.94 The
Sierra Club95 alleged that the energy group violated the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”) because the group never publicly
disclosed information from their meetings, yet, non-government
individuals fully participated in the closed door meetings as de
facto members.96 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Vice
President Cheney.97
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The news coverage of the duck-hunting trip shadowed the
Supreme Court decision.98 Prior to the oral arguments, countless
news sources raised ethical questions regarding the legality of
Justice Scalia engaging in personal activities with a future
defendant.99 As a result of the media coverage the Sierra Club
filed a motion to recuse Justice Scalia.100 The months of
speculative improprieties waned on the associate justice, and on
March 18, 2004, Justice Scalia released a memorandum vehemently
denying any and all suggestions that he should recuse himself
from Cheney.101 In fairness to Justice Scalia, the memorandum
clarified the facts in such a manner that it appeared Vice
President Cheney and Justice Scalia never discussed the case.102
The significance of this memorandum is that it essentially
quashed the argument that Justice Scalia’s personal and
professional worlds were forming a nexus of impropriety—-which
would have violated the appearance standard of § 455(a). Some
scholars believe that drafting memoranda when questions of
recusal are present would solve much of the public skepticism
aimed at the recusal process.103
Scalia’s memorandum had quickly written off the Sierra
Club’s allegations because their motion based the majority of
its argument on newspaper articles—-misstating the facts--rather
than pure legal arguments.104 Contrary to his usual flawless
rhetoric, Justice Scalia misapplied the § 455(a) standard in his
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memorandum when he stated “The question, simply put, is whether
someone who thought I could decide this case impartially despite
my friendship with the Vice President would reasonably believe
that I cannot decide it impartially because I went hunting with
a friend.”105 The Justice substituted the tougher standard might
question impartiality with “what a reasonable person believes
about the Justice’s impartiality.”106 Additionally, “[T]he point
is not that Scalia cannot decide the case impartially, but
again, that a reasonable person might question whether he can do
so.”107 When Justice Scalia stretched the language of § 455(a),
it appeared to implicate him; however, in light of the actual
facts of the hunting-trip and the regularity that Justices
personally associate with Executive officials,108 it seems fair
to give Justice Scalia the benefit of the doubt.109 To the dismay
of Justice Scalia, his memorandum had little or no effect on his
critics.110 While the memorandum did little in gaining support,
it helped the public understand the reasoning behind why a
Justice decided against recusal,111 which is more than can be
said for the way Justice Roberts handled Hamdan.112
In both Cheney and Hamdan, the court decided a separation
of powers issue involving high profile defendants;113 the recusal
controversy surrounding both cases involved the § 455(a)
appearance of impropriety standard.114 Even when taking into
consideration Scalia’s memorandum, an objective observer could
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reasonably question both the judge and Justice’s impartiality;
on the one hand, Roberts had an opportunity to serve for the
most prestigious court in the free world, and on the other hand,
Scalia had an opportunity to ensure a lower court did not
patronize his friend.115 Nevertheless, Scalia defended himself
against disqualification via the memorandum, which he did not
even have to do, Roberts did not.116 The Supreme Court had no
replacement if Justice Scalia recused from Cheney;117 conversely,
finding a replacement for Judge Roberts at the appeals court
level presented very little problem.118 Both situations appear to
fail the § 455(a) standard--“whether his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned”—-because it looks as if both judges
had a logical reason to favor a litigant. In light of all the
facts, a litigant’s right to a fair trial suffers the most when
a Supreme Court Justice recuses himself because he or she can
not be replaced;119 therefore, Roberts refusal to disqualify
himself may be perceived as more serious.
While Cheney does not help interpret the §455(a)
impartiality standard, the case publicizes a serious problem
that our most hallowed courtrooms currently suffer—-judges who
believe the recusal standard is overly vague,120 and as a
consequence, ignore the standard. Additionally, the Scalia
memorandum elucidated the Justice’s interaction with the Vice
President; a tool, that if utilized more frequently would uphold
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the purpose of the appearance standard—-to satisfy the public’s
confidence in an autonomous judiciary.121 Last, the detailed
account of the Roberts’ recusal controversy compared with
Scalia’s controversy in Cheney reinforces the lack of teeth the
recusal standard possesses and buttresses the argument for
recusal reform.

ii. The Pledge of Allegiance Case
Prior to the Cheney episode, Justice Scalia’s first recusal
controversy involved a First Amendment case which originated in
the state of California.122 Newdow is similar to both Hamdan and
Cheney because the appearance standard of § 455(a) ultimately
guided the Associate Justice to recuse himself.123 Again, Newdow
like Cheney, does not help with the interpretation of the
appearance standard; however, Newdow provides an example of a
situation where a Justice must recuse himself from deciding a
highly contested issue, and furthermore, evinces the need for
recusal reform due to the unclear standard of § 455(a).
On January 12, 2003, Justice Scalia spoke at a
Fredericksburg, Virginia religious freedom event sponsored in
part by the Knights of Columbus.124 As the main speaker, Scalia
indicated that the Ninth Circuit decision in Newdow v. United
States Congress misinterpreted the Establishment Clause.125 As
history often repeats itself, Justice Scalia’s comments on the
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merits of Newdow stirred up controversy because the Supreme
Court granted certiorari nine months after his speech.126 Michael
Newdow raised a constitutional challenge on behalf of his
daughter, arguing that recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance
violates the First Amendment.127 Specifically, Newdow stated that
the phrase “under God” violates the Establishment clause of the
First Amendment.128 Prior to the oral arguments before the
Supreme Court, Michael Newdow filed a motion to recuse Justice
Scalia based on his January 12 comments.129 Newdow believed that
Justice Scalia’s comments evidenced that the Justice had already
decided his position without reading the briefs; a situation
where an objective person might reasonably question the judge’s
impartiality.130 Justice Scalia recused,131 but unlike Cheney, no
memorandum explaining the reasoning behind his decision
accompanied his action. While a legal memorandum is not a
requirement of recusal, when a judge provides these details-especially a Supreme Court Justice—-it guides other judges in
deciding what actions would, and would not, be appropriate to
justify recusal. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the school
district, but not on Constitutional grounds;132 the Court found
that Newdow lacked the requisite standing requirement133 to bring
a claim on behalf of his daughter.134
While Scalia deprived the public of an insightful
memorandum,135 the actions which caused the respondent to
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question the Justice’s impartiality were legally
straightforward.136 A Justice commenting on a particular case
before he hears the arguments implies a prematurely formed
opinion; an opinion that an objective observer might reasonably
question would allow the Justice to decide the legal issue
impartially. Conversely, the facts surrounding the Roberts
appearance of impropriety do not apply to § 455(a) as easily.137
Roberts never made a statement explaining his ambition to become
a Supreme Court Justice or his outward support of the Military
Commissions. The lack of a public record to this effect
differentiates Roberts’ situation with Scalia’s. Contrasting
Newdow with Hamdan helps reinforce the vague appearance standard
inherent in § 455(a). While the facts in Newdow made its
application to the appearance standard easier, the lack of a
memorandum stating the legal reasoning continued the
misunderstanding of recusal law,138 which is one of the chief
reasons that Hamdan is so controversial.139
The magnitude of the potential outcome from the Supreme
Court decision differed dramatically between Newdow and Hamdan.
No one can deny that the Establishment Clause separating church
and state is a critical legal issue in American jurisprudence;140
however, the Supreme Court ended up deciding an issue of
standing rather than Constitutionality.141 Alternatively, in
Hamdan, the stakes were exceptionally high for the Bush
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administration’s war on terror.142 As one of three judges hearing
Hamdan, Roberts knew that the administration urgently needed the
Circuit Court to find that the Military Commissions--created by
President Bush--did not violate the separation of powers
inherent in the Constitution. Joining the majority opinion in
full, Roberts’ approval of the Military Commissions to prosecute
terrorists probably went over well in his interview with
President Bush later that day.143 In light of the aforementioned
reasons, it appears entirely rational that an outside observer
might reasonably question Roberts’ impartiality where President
Bush was the defendant.144
Ultimately, the appearance standard145 is the recusal
statute that would govern both Hamdan and Newdow. Two concepts
within both situations must be observed to understand their
connection. First, Scalia’s critical comments of the Ninth
Circuit Court’s opinion on a legal matter that was granted
Certiorari, provided a straightforward example of an appearance
of bias by a Supreme Court Justice;146 whereas, judge Roberts’—-a
D.C. Circuit Court Judge--apparent bias resulted from a
communication he had with a future litigant, the Bush
Administration, which was undoubtedly a more tenuous bias.147
Both situations present distinguished, high level judges taking
actions where it would be “reasonable” for his “impartiality” to
be “questioned.” Second, while legal commentators have
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established that the Newdow situation was relatively
straightforward,148 the implications of the Constitutional
question argued in Newdow does not reach the level of volatility
that the questions raised in Hamdan reach.149 As explained
earlier, the high Court did not even decide Newdow on the First
Amendment issue.150 But, had such an issue been decided, the
repercussions of that ruling could not have reached the level of
importance of the separation of powers issues decided by the
Circuit Court in Hamdan.151

D. Reforming Recusal—-Winning back the Public Trust
An in depth look into Hamdan, Cheney, and Newdow, provides
some insight into the inexact science of applying recusal law to
real life situations. In recent years, several scholars have
devised recusal standards to bring clarity to the law.152 While
individual aspects of each standard show promise, this Comment
proposes its own standard, which focuses much of its attention
on maintaining impartiality to optimize public trust.

i. The Process Oriented Approach
Legal scholar Amanda Frost takes a comprehensive look at
the ineffectiveness of the current recusal law and concludes
that including the legal process components153 in recusal
procedure would ultimately make recusal more effective and
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trustworthy.154 The five components include: “litigants, not
courts, initiate disputes; the disputes are presented through an
adversarial system in which two or more competing parties give
their conflicting views; a rationale must be given for
decisions; decisions must refer to, and be restricted by, an
identifiable body of law; and the decisionmaker must be
impartial.”155

Frost proposes that the self-enforcing156 nature

of § 455 should be amended so that an easily applied procedure
exists where litigants can seek a judicial disqualification.157
Additionally, Frost believes that § 455 should be amended so
that judges are required to disclose all information-—where
questions of impartiality might arise--directly to the
litigants, as opposed to only disclosing information upon a
litigant’s request.158 Next, Frost concludes that the court
should refer recusal motions to a neutral judge rather than the
judge in question because this would protect the integrity of
the judiciary.159 Finally, Frost states that a judge who faces a
recusal motion should be encouraged to file a statement
explaining why recusal is not justified;160 if the judge does
decide to disqualify himself, Frost believes that he or she
should explain his or her decision for removal to “provide a
body of precedent to guide judges facing such decisions in the
future.”161
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Professor Frost’s reforms certainly could have suppressed
much of the public clamor that resulted from the Roberts recusal
situation. If Judge Roberts had disclosed the information
regarding his interviews with administration officials prior to
oral arguments, the public and Hamdan’s lawyer would have had
less reason to suspect any impropriety. Also, if Hamdan’s lawyer
filed a motion because he was not satisfied with Roberts’
disclosure, a neutral judge deciding on the merits of the motion
along with the supplemented explanation162 by Roberts would
surely alleviate the appearance of an impropriety. However, the
Frost standard places a lot of extra responsibility on the judge
who faces recusal,163 especially since many judges take it
personally when their impartiality is challenged.164

ii. Increase Recusal Motions Approach
Legal scholar Debra Bassett concentrates on applying her
recusal reform to the Supreme Court, but the standard is just as
relevant to the lower courts.165 At times, the Bassett standard
appears to be a carbon copy of the process oriented approach;166
nevertheless, Bassett chiefly emphasizes disclosure of
potentially germane information by judges—-increasing the flow
of information from the judiciary to the public.167 Professor
Bassett proposes that the self-enforcing standard for
disqualification should remain,168 but that the court draft a new

25

statement of recusal.169 Bassett believes that “statements of
interest” will serve as a means to bring transparency to the
judiciary because the statements will become a public record of
any and all potential biases.170 As the key component of Basset’s
reform, “Statements of interest” provide courts with a pragmatic
solution to an often difficult task—-maintaining efficiency171
and the perception of flawless integrity.172
Although the “statements of interest” probably would have
informed Hamdan’s lawyer and the public about the relationship
between the Bush administration—-defendants in the case—-and
Roberts; the former Circuit Court judge inferred that the
interviews173 did not create an appearance of impropriety because
Hamdan sued President Bush in his official capacity.174 Contrary
to the process oriented approach, the lack of a neutral
decisionmaker deciding whether Roberts appeared impartial, shows
Bassett’s weakness; as Roberts implied in the Senate
questioning, no rules had been broken. Therefore, it appears
that as long as the recusal decision was up to Roberts, he was
going to hear Hamdan.

E. The Oversight Committee Approach
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A look into the congressional purpose of § 455(a) reveals
that the 1974 amendment functioned to “promote public confidence
in the impartiality of the judicial process.”175 The main
component of an effective recusal law standard would necessitate
a completely neutral viewpoint to maintain public confidence.176
While Professor Bassett’s proposition left
disqualification solely to the discretion of the judge;177
Professor Frost stressed the importance of a neutral
decisionmaker and placed the onus--of determining the
appropriateness of disqualification--on another judge.178
However, this Comment proposes that an independent oversight
committee composed of retired federal judges decide whether the
recusal motion is justifiable.179 Leaving disqualification to the
sole discretion of the judge in question does not uphold a high
enough standard.180 Additionally, many judges find disqualifying
a fellow colleague too difficult.181 Retired federal judges would
have a whole career to document their fairness and at this point
in their lives would certainly not want to tarnish the
reputation they spent years building.182
The selection process would involve two branches of the
government. The President would generate a twenty judge short
list183 from the pool of retired judges184 and pass the list onto
the judicial branch. Two Senior Circuit Court judges from each
of the thirteen circuits would vote on five of the candidates;185
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the top five vote grossing retired judges would be appointed to
the oversight committee.186 However, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court would have the power to veto one of the appointed
judges;187 the veto power is necessary because the oversight
committee would have the authority to recuse Supreme Court
Justices. Justices would, of course, continue to have the
ability to recuse themselves, but as the Roberts’ situation
proves, determining one’s disqualification is not an easy task.
The oversight committee approach would differ from the
Frost and Bassett approaches because the committee would be
capable of eliminating the subconscious biases188-—due to the
detached nature of the retired judges--present in a judge and
his colleagues. Unlike § 455(b), which lists specific
circumstances calling for a judge’s recusal,189 the oversight
committee would concentrate on deciding disqualification in the
difficult situations, such as where an appearance of impropriety
motion is filed. The committee would require the justice in
question to submit any pertinent information regarding his
potential for bias. After carefully considering all relevant
information—-the motion and judge submission--the oversight
committee will issue a thoughtful opinion determining whether
recusal is appropriate. While displacing a judge may cause
contempt towards the committee, over time, the opinions will
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form a body of recusal law that will help judges understand when
recusal is, and is not, appropriate.190
This Comment cannot answer whether the independent
oversight committee would have disqualified Roberts from Hamdan;
however, the committee would have thoroughly scrutinized whether
the interviews with the Bush administration could cause the
public to question Roberts’ impartiality. The sole fact that a
detached oversight committee is making the decision rather than
a judge or colleague should suppress any public distrust. While
nobody doubts Chief Justice Roberts is a man of high integrity,
the appearance that his loyalty could consciously or
subconsciously sway his opinion,191 is enough to require an
oversight committee to make the final decision.
The past few years have shown that the Supreme Court is not
as infallible as once thought.192 In 1993, the high court
released a statement asserting that the Court would limit the
coverage of § 455 to its Justices.193 The recent controversies
indicate that even the most judicious minds in the world may
have their impartiality questioned. However, allowing the
independent oversight committee to determine questions of
impartiality—-for all federal courts--will “promote public
confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.”194
Undoubtedly, the application of the oversight committee
raises questions. Is there a separation of powers issue? The
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judiciary might argue that the oversight committee takes away
the independence vested upon their branch by the Constitution;
nonetheless, this is not a statute dictating how the judiciary
should rule on law, and the Constitution permits limited
regulation of the judicial branch.195 The involvement of each
branch in the implementation of the oversight committee should
evince Constitutional compliance. Won’t the Commission have too
many motions to deal with? It is no secret that the federal
docket is severely backed up,196 however, no one can predict
whether this would translate into a backed up oversight
committee. In the beginning, the committee will have their hands
full, but as more decisions become published and the body of
recusal law grows, fewer litigants will file motions because the
recusal standards will provide them guidance.
The public wants to believe that the judiciary is an
impartial actor.197 In the slim chance that a situation of
impropriety or “an appearance of impropriety” presents itself,
the public confidence in the judicial branch will remain
unwavering because a detached oversight committee will see to it
that justice is preserved.

IV. Conclusion
The rich history of recusal in American jurisprudence is a
testament to the importance our Founding Fathers placed on
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integrity. While most federal judges exemplify honesty, their
political or personal relationships can sometimes leave others
with a skewed perception. This Comment covered several
situations where the impartiality of a judge was questioned;
sure enough, these situations reinforced the notion that recusal
law in American jurisprudence remains vague. Certainly, the
judiciary faces a quandary when applying the current recusal
standards; in spite of this, several scholars have proposed well
reasoned reforms that show promise. The oversight committee
approach recommended by this Comment combines the most rational
components of the scholarly suggestions with the most
perceptible gaps in recusal law. Chief Justice Roberts got
appointed to the Supreme Court for his accolades, not for his
bias. But, an objective observer could have questioned his
impartiality based on the timing of the interviews with the
trial proceedings, which clearly violates § 455(a). The
oversight committee would have quashed the Hamdan controversy
while creating important guidelines for future judges and
litigants to follow. Just how clear-cut was Roberts’ opinion not
to disqualify himself? The Supreme Court granted Hamdan
certiorari on November 7, 2005, and Chief Justice Roberts
recused himself from that decision.198
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D.C. Circuit did not exactly give the President a blank check,
it certainly extended him a very large line of credit.”).
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90

Legal scholar Ronald Rotunda argues that if Federal

Judges recuse themselves from hearing cases where the Federal
Government is a litigant—-once they find out they are in
consideration of an appointment to the high court—-several court
dockets would need to be shuffled to make such accommodations,
which would burden an already encumbered area of American
jurisprudence. Memorandum from Ronald D. Rotunda, Professor,
George Mason University, to Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, at 9 (Aug. 22, 2005) (on file with Roberts
hearings). This Comment avoids the problem Rotunda suggests
would have accompanied a recusal by judge Roberts as a result of
the government being a litigant: President Bush was a defendant
in Hamdan and his personal involvement in deciding that Salim
Hamdan was an enemy combatant makes him a direct defendant;
however, the majority of cases where the Federal Government is a
litigant and Executive officials are not being sued directly,
the Solicitor General is the defendant—we will call this onestep removed. The United States Department of Justice, Office of
the Solicitor General, Functions of the Office,
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/aboutosg/function.html, (2006).
Therefore, Rotunda’s argument that several judges in contention
for a high court nomination will have to recuse themselves from
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hearing cases that involve the government only holds true when
an Executive Official is directly involved.
91

In Cheney v. United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, the Supreme Court determined that the
District Court’s orders to allow extremely broad discovery,
impaired the functioning of the Executive branch. This
separation of powers issue was significant enough for the high
court to overturn the appellate court and disallow the broad
discovery. In Newdow v. United States Congress, the petitioner
believed that recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance violated
the Establishment clause of the First Amendment—-a very
significant issue in our current cultural polarization.
92

While the Newdow situation preceded Cheney, the public

scrutiny of the duck-hunt was much more controversial and is the
primary reason this Comment stresses Cheney as causing the
Supreme Court’s luck to run out.
93

See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915-16

(2004) (mem.) (Scalia, J.) (stating that the duck hunting trip
was planned long before the Court granted cert. to hear Cheney).
94

See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 124 S. Ct.

2576, 2582 (2004) (explaining that the energy group was directed
to develop a national energy policy that would promote
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“dependable, affordable, and environmentally sound” energy for
the future).
95

The Sierra Club, http://www.sierraclub.org/ (last visited

Feb. 15, 2006) (stating that “[t]he Club is America's oldest,
largest and most influential grassroots environmental
organization.”—-which conveys a logical reason for their concern
with America’s energy policy).
The most outspoken respondent was the Sierra Club.
96

Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2583 (explaining that the complaint

filed by the Sierra Club alleges that non-federal employees
participated in the non-public NEPDG meetings, which would mean
that FACA would apply—-subjecting the group to a variety of
open-meeting and disclosure requirements that were never met;
therefore, the energy group should not benefit from the Act’s
exemption of public disclosure requirements).
97

Id. at 2953 (stating that the Circuit Court

misinterpreted United States v. Nixon and terminated its inquiry
into whether a writ of mandamus would be appropriate in a
situation where an overly broad discovery order by the District
Court could impair the executive branches performance of its
constitutional duties—-raising separation of powers issues).
98

Dana Mulhauser, Half Court, The New Republic Online, June

25, 2004,

55

http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=express&s=mulhauser062504
(discussing the impact Justice Scalia’s refusal to recuse
himself may have had in the high court’s finding of law).
99

See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Scalia’s Trip With Cheney

Raises Questions of Impartiality, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2004, at
A14 (stating that as a result of Mr. Cheney’s trip with Justice
Scalia, Democrats in Congress and legal ethics experts believe
that Justice Scalia should recuse himself from hearing the case
where Mr. Cheney is the defendant—-explaining the validity of
his energy task force); Charles Lane, High Court Questioned On
Allowing Scalia Trip, Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 2004, at A4
(commenting on the fact that Scalia traveled with Cheney to duck
hunt after the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case involving
Cheney’s energy task force and that the Justice stated that
people could not reasonably question his impartiality based on
the trip); Dana Milbank, Scalia Joined Cheney on Flight;
Justice’s Ride on Air Force Two Adds New Element to Conflict
Issue, Wash. Post, Feb 6, 2004, at A4 (“Bill Allison of the
Center for Public Integrity said that taxpayers would cover the
cost of flying Scalia, standard procedure for Air Force Two
passengers, but that the invitation from Cheney could add to
appearances of a conflict of interest. ‘It does raise the level
of closeness a little bit higher,’ Allison said. ‘It makes it
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seem more like Cheney was courting Scalia.’); David G. Savage,
Trip With Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight on Scalia; Friends hunt
ducks together, even as the justice is set to hear the vice
president’s case, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 2004, at A1 (explaining
that even though Scalia and Cheney are longtime friends and avid
hunters, several legal ethics scholars question whether the
timing of their trip may raise doubts about whether Scalia can
decide the case impartially).
100

See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004)

(mem.) (Scalia, J.) (“The organization moved for the recusal of
a United States Supreme Court Justice.”).
101

Id.

102

See Id. at 915 (stating that the trip was set long

before cert. was granted; the men never slept in the same room,
hunted in the same blinds, or ate in separate quarters). But see
Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and
the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 Rutgers L.
Rev. 107, 118-19 (2004) (“[W]e must take him at his word that he
and Cheney did not speak about the pending matter. This trust us
rationale, as it applies to (not) discussing the issues of the
case while publicly displaying friendship during the case’s
pendency, inherently risks ignoring the reality of friendship
and undervaluing public perception.”).
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103

See discussion infra Part D(i).

104

Cheney, 541 U.S. at 922. See also Roberts, supra note

102, at 120 (“Instead of relying purely on the hypothetical
objective person to show that the Justice’s impartiality was
reasonably in question, the Sierra Club supplied a plethora of
news accounts raising impartiality questions based on Justice
Scalia’s actions.”).
105

Cheney, 541 U.S. at 928-29.

106

Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia’s

Memorandum in the Cheney Case, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 229, 234
(2004).
107

Id.

108

See Cheney, 541 U.S at 916 (“[F]rom the earliest days

down to modern times Justices have had close personal
relationships with the President and other officers of the
Executive.”).
109

See generally Flamm, supra note 13, § 5.63, at 159

(“[A]s a practical matter, because the challenged judge will
usually decide the disqualification motion himself . . . . [T]he
challenged judge’s subjective view as to what a reasonable
person would believe is, in many instances, dispositive.”).
110

See Dahlia Lithwick, Je Refuse!, Slate, Mar. 18, 2004,

http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2097350
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(“[F]or all of Scalia’s intellectual force, rhetorical genius,
and passion, this memorandum will not silence his critics . . .
. [W]e also all now demand transparency, ideological litmus
tests, and full disclosure. We have lost faith in judicial
integrity, and Scalia’s call to trust me may be too late.”); see
also Roberts, supra note 102, at 118-19 (“Justice Scalia
demonstrates his power for prose, as is often the case, but he
dismisses the recusal motion primarily based on its form rather
than the heart of the attack . . . . Self-declaration of one’s
own impartiality does not answer the call of the question posed
by the judicial recusal standards; rather, it is an unhelpful
and unpersuasive tautology.”).
111

See generally Bassett, supra note 79, at 703 (“Under the

Supreme Court’s current recusal practices, a Justice’s decision
not to participate in a case typically is not explained, leaving
Court-watchers to guess the reason for a particular Justice’s
non-participation.”).
112

Hearing, supra note 53, at 3 (Statement of S. Feingold,

Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (explaining that Judge
Roberts has been overly hesitant to discuss Hamdan).
113

In both cases the executive officer was sued in his

official capacity rather than on a personal level. This concept
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is important to understand because the consequences of an
unfavorable ruling in a personal capacity are much more severe.
114

See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 914 (mem.)

(Scalia, J.) (2004) (explaining that the appearance standard
shall apply to the facts as they existed, not as others report
them); Gillers, et al. supra note 52 (stating that the
controversy lies in the public’s perception of a courtroom
impropriety).
115

See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 124 S. Ct.

2576 (2004) (“This Court has issued mandamus to, inter alia,
restrain a lower court whose actions would threaten the
separation of powers by embarrassing the Executive Branch.”).
116

The fact that Justice Scalia wrote a memorandum has no

significance in applying his duck-hunting trip to the appearance
standard—his trip still had the appearance of a personal
relationship with a future litigant. However, the memorandum
lays a foundation for change, which if applied properly could
have prevented the duck-hunt debacle because the American public
would lack reason to question the Justice’s intentions.
117

See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (mem.)

(Scalia, J.) (2004) (“On the Supreme Court, however, the
consequence is different: The Court proceeds with eight
Justices, raising the possibility that, by reason of a tie vote,
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it will find itself unable to resolve the significant legal
issue presented by the case.”).
118

28 U.S.C § 46(b) (2000).

119

Sup. Ct. R. 4.

120

See Flamm, supra note 13, Addendum to Appendix A, at

1068 (explaining that the important position the Supreme Court
plays in American jurisprudence makes it inappropriate to be
excessively cautious when a Justice faces a recusal situation).
121

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.

847, 859-60 (1988).
122

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 9

(2004).
123

See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (mem.)

(Scalia, J.) (2004) (stating that he recused himself in Newdow
because of the appearance of impropriety standard, which the
Sierra Club questioned him in Cheney).
124

Suggestion for Recusal of Justice Scalia at 3, Elk Grove

Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 03-7).
125

See Id. at 3 (“Justice Scalia apparently indicated that

the Ninth Circuit decision in the instant case was based on a
flawed reading of the Establishment Clause. Yet it is highly
unlikely that the Justice had ever read any of the briefs in the
case.”). See also Jacueline L. Salmon, Scalia Defends Public
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Expression of Faith; Recent Rulings Have Gone Too Far, Justice
Says During Tribute to Va. Gathering, Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 2003,
at B3 (“In a short speech . . . . Scalia criticized court
decisions in recent years that have outlawed expressions of
religious faith in public events. He cited as an example a
California federal court ruling last summer that the words under
God in the Pledge of Allegiance were a violation of the
separation of church and state.”).
126

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945

(2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2003)
(No. 02-1624).
127

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4

(2003).
128

Id.

129

Recusal Motion, supra note 97, at 3.

130

See Id. (“Under such circumstances – where he

prematurely indicated that a lower court’s decision was wrong in
a case he would likely hear – one might certainly reasonably
question his impartiality.”).
131

Newdow, 542 U.S. at 5.

132

See Id. at 26-27 (“When hard questions of domestic

relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is
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for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to
resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law.”).
133

Id. at 22-23 (“Newdow’s standing derives entirely from

his relationship with his daughter, but he lacks the right to
litigate as her next friend . . . . [T]he interests of this
parent [Michael Newdow] and this child are not parallel and,
indeed, are potentially in conflict.”).
134

Id. at 27 (stating that a California order giving

exclusive legal rights of the child to the mother prohibits
“[Michael Newdow’s] claimed right to shield his daughter from
influences [reciting the Pledge of Allegiance] to which she is
exposed.”).
135

Roberts, supra note 102, at 125 (“The lack of any

reasoned elaboration from Justice Scalia regarding his decision
to recuse in Newdow leaves the public with a limited
understanding of the basis for recusal in the first place.”).
136

See Bloom, supra note 5, at 696-97 (“Prejudgment of the

legal merits of the case is the easiest situation to resolve.
When the prejudgment involves the application of law to specific
facts in a particular case, disqualification is appropriate.
“Unlike the development by judges of consistent views on legal
principles, prior formulation or expression of opinion on the
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merits of a pending case is not an activity which the public
expects of judges or has reason to encourage.”).
137

See generally Memorandum from Ronald D. Rotunda,

Professor, George Mason University, to Arlen Specter, Chairman,
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, at 8 (Aug. 22, 2005) (on file with
Roberts hearings) (“When Roberts had a conversation with the
Attorney General in early April of 2005 (before there was any
opening on the Court), it is common knowledge that he was not
the only judge being considered for possible elevation to the
Supreme Court. Even the day before (and the morning of) the
final announcement on July 19, news reports told us who they
thought the nominee would be, and the various names that were
published were hardly limited to Roberts.”). But see Tom Brune,
Roberts meeting ‘illegal’, Nation, Aug. 18, 2005,
http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/nyuscort184388315aug18,0,5829402.story (stating that as a result
of the White House interviewing John G. Roberts for the Supreme
Court position as he heard a challenge to the president’s
military tribunals, three legal ethicists said the White House
broke the law).
138

See generally Roberts, supra note 102, at 168-71

(explaining that recusal accompanied by a memorandum would help
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create a body of knowledge that would provide guidance to the
public, lawyers, and judges).
139

While no scholars have directly argued that a

memorandum-—similar to the one from Cheney--clarifying the legal
reasoning for Judge Roberts decision to hear Hamdan would have
cleared any appearance misconceptions, the polarized opinions in
the legal community clearly support a conclusion that Hamdan
exploits the weaknesses of the appearance standard’s unclear
application. See Gillers, et al., supra note 52 (stating that
the timing of the interviews and the fact that President Bush
personalized designated Hamdan an enemy combatant makes the
Roberts’ situation applicable to the standard, which should have
resulted in his recusal). But see Rotunda, supra note 90, at 13
(stating that the Gillers’ standard is harsher than the actual
standard set forth in § 455(a), and that Roberts did not need to
recuse himself because there was never an appearance of
impropriety).
140

See Everson v. Board of Educ. Of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-

16 (1947) (“The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another . . . . In the words of [Thomas] Jefferson, the clause
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against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
“a wall of separation between church and state.”).
141

Newdow, 542 U.S. at 26.

142

If the district court’s opinion prevailed, the Geneva

Conventions would apply to the alleged terrorists, resulting in
trial by court-martial rather than—-the due process lacking-Military Commissions.
143

Bravin, supra note 4, at A4 (“On July 15, when Judge

Roberts met with President Bush for the job-clinching interview,
he joined a ruling in favor of the defendants, who included Mr.
Bush.”).
144

See Gillers, et al. supra note 52 (“The problem is that

if one side that very much wants to win a certain case can
secretly approach the judge about a dream job while the case is
still under active consideration, and especially if the judge
shows interest in the job, the public’s trust in the judiciary
(not to mention the opposing party’s) suffers because the public
can never know how the approach may have affected the judge’s
thinking.”). But see Rotunda, supra note 90, at 13 (“Judge
Roberts did not apply for a job; he did not negotiate the terms
of employment; he did not initiate a meeting; he was no
suppliant; he simply accepted the invitation of the Attorney
General to meet to discuss a possible Supreme Court vacancy.”).
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145

28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).

146

See Roberts, supra note 102, at 123-24 (explaining that

Justice Scalia’s comments at the rally raised serious doubts
that he could decide the case impartially).
147

See Rotunda, supra note 90, at 3-8 (explaining that

Gillers incorrectly reads the vague § 455(a) catch all phrase,
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” which as a
result, broadens the standard inappropriately, making its
application to situations like Hamdan questionable.
148

Roberts, supra note 102, at 123-24.

149

See Gillers, et al., supra note 52 (“What is immediately

at stake, however, is the appearance of justice in the Hamdan
case and the proper resolution of an important legal question
about the limits on presidential power.”).
150

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 22-

23 (2003).
151

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,

655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that the
foundation of American liberty is that our law ensures the
maintenance of the separation of powers, “[w]ith all its
defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no
technique for long preserving free government except that the
Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by
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parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may be destined
to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not
first, to give them up.”).
152

See Frost, supra note 13, at 535 (“The solution I offer

is to incorporate into recusal law the core tenets of
adjudication identified fifty years ago by Legal Process
theorists as essential to maintaining the judiciary’s
legitimacy.”); Bassett, supra note 79, at 702-03 (“This article
proposes that the Court encourage recusal motions from parties
appearing before the Court . . . . An increase in the filing of
recusal motions would increase the information available to the
Court and to the public.”).
153

Frost extracted five procedural components of

adjudication from the myriad scholarship of Legal Process
theorists, which are essential to legitimize the process. See
Id. at 556-57 (“These procedures are thus legitimating not only
because they provide a theoretical justification for the
exercise of judicial power in a democracy, but also because they
serve to further the Framers’ intended role for the courts in
our constitutional structure.”).
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154

Id. at 556.

155

Id. at 555-56.

156

Flamm, supra note 13, § 26.3.4, at 748 (“[Section] 455

is stated in terms of a self-enforcing obligation, and courts
generally agree that §455 was intended to ensure that federal
judges would disqualify themselves in appropriate circumstances
without any action on the part of a party.”).
157

See Frost, supra note 13, at 582 (“Accordingly, § 455

should be amended to provide that the parties have a right to
seek a judge’s recusal by motion filed within an appropriate
amount of time after obtaining information that suggests that
the judge could not be impartial or that his impartiality might
“reasonably be questioned.”); see also Gina Holland, Scalia
Won’t Step Aside from Cheney Legal Issue, Lansing St. J., Mar.
19, 2004, at 5A (noting that “[T]here are no clear procedures
for litigators who seek to disqualify Supreme Court Justices.”)
158

Frost, supra note 13, at 583 (“The proposal discussed

here takes this disclose requirement significantly further by
requiring the judge to provide directly to litigants in pending
cases any information that might be considered to have an impact
on the judge’s partiality.”).
159

Id. at 584 (“Providing for an impartial decisionmaker on

the question of recusal serves both to prevent actual injustice
and the appearance of injustice.”). See also Hawaii-Pac. Venture
Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 437 F. Supp. 230, 236 (D. Haw. 1977)
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(proposing that a situation could arise where a judge who faced
recusal refers the motion to another judge to promote “public
confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.”).
160

Frost, supra note 13, at 588 (“The challenged judge is

the most natural party to respond to a motion to disqualify. He
will be familiar with the facts cited by the moving party and is
best able to put those facts in context for the
decisionmaker.”).
161

Id. at 589.

162

See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004)

(mem.) (Scalia, J.) (explaining in great detail why recusal was
inappropriate in light of the circumstances); see also Laird v.
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J.) (stating that
an explanation for recusal is appropriate in certain
situations).
163

Frost, supra note 13, at 582-90 (having to disclose any

and all financial interests, personal relationships, prior
knowledge of issues in a case; drafting a statement of innocence
to refute the motion; and after the judge has gone through the
aforementioned protocol, submitting a statement explaining the
reasons why recusal was appropriate).
164

See Flamm, supra note 13, § 1.10.5, at 25 (“Just as

judges generally do not like to admit having committed legal
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error, they are typically less than eager to acknowledge the
existence of situations that may raise questions about their
impartiality . . . . [I]t must be acknowledged that the filing
of a judicial disqualification motion may antagonize the
challenged judge either consciously or subconsciously.”);
Bassett, supra note 79, at 672 (“[M]any judges respond to
potential recusal situations with a defensive—sometimes
arrogant—“I am not biased; I can be fair.””); Donald C. Nugent,
Judicial Bias, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1994) (“[J]udges are
typically appalled if their impartiality is called into
question.”).
165

Bassett, supra note 79, at 702.

166

Id. at 703-05 (stating that the standard would encourage

litigants to file recusal motions and draft “statements of
interest” that “disclose[s] on the record information that [the]
judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider
relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge
believes there is no real basis for disqualification.”).
167

Id. at 704 (“[I]f Justices were consistently to

acknowledge all potential interests in the litigation before
them [through “statements of interest”], such acknowledgements
might invigorate public confidence in the Court—while at the
same time preserving the Court’s critical function.”).
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168

Bassett provides no rationale of why self-enforcement is

good or bad, but from her support of the status quo it appears
that she believes the current standard is effective. But see
Bloom, supra note 5, at 697 (stating that transfer of a recusal
motion to a different judge comports more closely to the
objective standard of § 455(a) and could be more effective for
preserving judicial integrity).
169

Bassett, supra note 79, at 703 (stating that the new

Statement of Recusal Policy should clarify the narrow approach
so that a Justice only recuse when there is actual bias or an
appearance of impropriety). Bassett’s “quick and dirty” approach
leaves the reader guessing what the professor suggests would
help elucidate the high courts already narrow policy.
170

Id. at 704.

171

See Id. at 704 (“[P]ermitting all of the Justices to

participate in the vast majority of cases.”).
172

Id. (“The institution of “statements of interest” would

avoid fear by the public of unknown, unacknowledged
relationships, interest, or biases that Justices might have in a
particular case, and would serve a policing function for the
Justices as well.”).
173

Gillers, et al. supra note 52 (“[The] Senate questionare

reveal[s] that Roberts had several interviews with
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administration officials contemporaneous with the progress of
the Hamdan appeal.”).
174

See Hearing, supra note 53, at 2-3.

175

H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.
176

See Nugent, supra note 164, at 3 (“Fundamental to the

notion of a fair trial and tribunal is the principle that a
judge shall apply the law impartially and free from the
influence of any personal biases.”). See generally Leubsdorf,
supra note 35, at 277 (suggesting how difficult it is for a
judge to know for whether they are completely impartial, “[y]et
even honest judges may be swayed by unacknowledged motives.”).
177

See Bassett, supra note 79, at 695 (explaining that

recusal would remain the decision of the Justice, but that a new
Supreme Court recusal statement would help clarify the
appearance standard’s application to the Supreme Court).
178

See Frost, supra note 13, at 583-87 (explaining that a

neutral decisionmaker will increase public confidence in the
judiciary).
179

See Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A

New Paradigm for Campaign Finance, at 129, (2002) (“[retired
judges have] been socialized into the cast of mind necessary for
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the successful operation of the FEC—cultivating habits of
impartiality in the name of the rule of law.”).
180

See Leubsdorf, supra note 43, at 277 (“[T]hough judges

should be free to withdraw voluntarily, no sensible judicial
system would leave disqualification entirely to the discretion
of the judge in question.”).
181

See Leubsdorf, supra note 43, at 277 (“When a judge is

challenged, considerations of decorum and the tendency of judges
to protect each other will make full exploration of the facts
even more difficult.”); see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 n.12 (1988) (“A finding by
another judge – faced with the difficult task of passing upon
the integrity of a fellow member of the bench – that his or her
colleague merely possessed constructive knowledge, and not
actual knowledge, is unlikely to significantly quell the
concerns of the skeptic.”). But See Frost, supra note 13, at 586
(“In any case, experience shows that judges are willing to risk
offending one another when obligated to pass judgment in the
course of fulfilling their judicial duties.”).
182

See Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A

New Paradigm for Campaign Finance, at 129 (2002) (explaining
that a better way to ensure that the F.E.C. would be impartial
is to make the composition of the governing body consist of
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retired federal judges; retired judges would have numerous
decisions that would allow for a full assessment of their
fairness.)
183

It seems that it would be difficult for any President to

find 20 retired judges who match his ideology—-reinforcing the
autonomy of the oversight committee.
184

Federal Judiciary Archives, Judges of the United States

Federal Courts Database, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj
(documenting that 166 federal judges have retired since January
1, 2000).
185

Like retired judges, many Senior Circuit Court judges do

not want to mar an esteemed career.
186

Cf. American Psychological Association, Are Six Heads as

Good as Twelve?, http://www.psychologymatters.org/jurysize.html
(1998) (stating that “[l]arger groups [are] more contentious,
debate more vigorously . . . . [M]a[k]e more consistent and
predictable decisions).
Applying the jury size concept to the retired judge
oversight committee is logical because a normal appellate panels
consists of three members.
187

If the Chief Justice decided to veto a judge, the sixth

highest vote grossing judge would be appointed to the oversight
committee.
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188

See Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 461 (7th

Cir. 1985) (explaining that the appearance standard must take
into account a judge’s unconscious bias); Bassett, supra note
79, at 671 (“[S]tudies of unconscious bias confirm the
observation that people who claim, and honestly believe they are
not prejudiced may nevertheless harbor unconscious stereotypes
and beliefs . . . . [T]hey [judges] will not always recognize
their own biases and stereotypes.”). See also Leubsdorf, supra
note 43, at 277 (explaining that while the judge hearing the
case knows his or her feelings about the parties better than
anyone else, unacknowledged motives can sway a judge’s opinion
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